Simulation models of the stock exchange are developed to explore the dependence between a trader's ability to predict future price movements and her wealth and probability of bankruptcy, to analyze the consequences of margin trading with different leverage rates and to compare different investment strategies for small traders. We show that in the absence of margin trading the rate of successful predictions should be slightly higher than 50% to guarantee with high probability that the final wealth is greater than the initial and to assure very little probability of bankruptcy, and such a small value explains why so many people try to trade on the stock exchange. However if trader uses margin trading, this rate should be much higher and high rate leads to the risk of excessive losses.
Introduction
The stock market is an organized financial market where securities can be bought and sold at prices formed by supply and demand. Stock market participants include individual investors and institutional investors such as banks, insurance companies, mutual, retirement and hedge funds. Traders have different trading goals, some use stocks as an investment to receive interest or dividends, others speculate to profit from short and medium term price movements.
In this paper we consider only price-takers, who are traders with relatively small capital and negligible market power. We suppose that they are speculators, because for a trader with a long-term investment goal it is more reasonable to invest in a mutual or hedge fund with professional investment management. Informed investment decisions should be based on the available economic and statistical information about the assets, analytical reports, economic and political news and can take into account even rumors concerning a security and its issuer.
However, individual investors generally do not have sufficient time, experience, ability, or access to the inside information, for fully informed decision making. According to estimates from [Brown et al. 1999] , the proportion of informed orders is less than 10% and, as was shown in [Barber 2008 ], individual investors tend to buy attention-grabbing stocks, which are in the news, experiencing abnormally high trading volume, or extreme one-day returns, while professional investors have more time and resources to continuously monitor a wider range of stocks. [Barber and Odean 2008] showed that the average trader turns over 75 percent of its portfolio annually and more than 250 percent for the traders who trade the most. These papers confirm the speculative nature of individual traders.
Speculators hope to make money in the stock market by betting on price moves. If such trader expects a price increase in the near future, she will buy securities now in order to sell them later and in the reverse situation (if she expects that prices will move down), the speculator will sell now and buy back later at a lower price. A speculator can, therefore, earn money on the stock exchange if she can correctly predict the future price of securities. The financial results of such a trader and the likelihood of bankruptcy depend on the accuracy of her predictions.
On average the stocks individual investors buy subsequently underperform those they sell [Odean 1999 ], which indicates their inability to predict the future price movements of securities.
In [Barber and Odean 2008] 66,465 trader accounts at a large discount broker between 1991 and 1996 were analyzed, and the average trader earned an annual return of 16.4 percent, while the market returns were 17.9 percent, and those who trade most earn less (11.4 percent). It is also known that even economic analysts often fail to achieve even a 50% rate of correct forecasts [Kahneman 2011 ]. In [Proskurin and Penikas 2013 ] the rate of successful expert 4 recommendations on selling and buying stocks of Russian companies was calculated and it was showed that only 56.8% of expert recommendations were profitable.
That is why in the first model we consider an agent with one characteristic denoting her probability of correctly predicting asset price movements. In [Aleskerov and Egorova 2012] it was shown that if this probability is slightly higher than 50%, it allows the trader to receive a positive average gain from trading.
Another consequence of the time and ability restrictions of the small trader decision making process is a propensity to herd or imitate, when traders mimic the actions (rational or irrational) of another trader or group of traders. In the first case there are traders in the market (a so called 'guru'), which other traders think to be more experienced, or lucky, or to have access to restricted information. The investment decisions of these players are of great interest to other agents and for some they can be a benchmark for decision making. The second case refers to a situation when the trader follows the mood of the market, that is, if everyone buys (a 'bull' market), then the trader will buy, and if everybody sells and the price falls (a 'bear' market), then the trader will also sell. Even professional players are tempted to follow the euphoria of bullish or bearish trends, although the propensity to herd is lower for professional investors than for the amateur [Venezia et al. 2011] .
It was shown in [Tedeschi et al. 2012 ] that traders have incentives to imitate and for some it turns out to be profitable. In [Rothig and Chiarella 2010 ] the activities of small traders on currency futures markets were investigated and it was shown that small traders follow large speculators, indicating that they believe themselves to be less well informed than the large speculators.
We also consider more exotic strategies, based on the expectation of a crisis. Taleb, the author of [Taleb 2008] , is the founder of the hedge fund "Empirica Capital", which bought derivatives with extreme values of strike price, because they are cheaper as extreme events are less probable. Thus Empirica was waiting for an opportunity to earn a lot of money in the rare event of a financial crisis (a financial crisis is called a 'black swan' in the Taleb's terminology) and was losing a little money each day because of the premiums paid for purchased options. This strategy is reasonable in 'a world of low levels of predictability' [Makridakis and Taleb 2009 ], but is not used by the majority of traders.
The aim of this study is (1) to investigate the connection between a trader's ability to predict future price movements, and her wealth and the probability of bankruptcy; (2) to analyze the consequences of margin trading with different leverage rates (margin trading is buying/selling of securities with cash/stocks borrowed from a broker and leverage rate is a ratio between the collateral and the loan); (3) to compare different investment strategies of small traders using an agent-based simulation of a stock exchange.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general properties of the models and data used, Section 3 provides a detailed description of the models, Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
The models

The description of the market and agents
In our model there is a market of one asset and a population of agents. All agents initially have $10 000 in cash and no securities. In the basic model the agents differ only in which models the probability of the agent to correctly predict the direction of the price movement the next day. It is assumed that does not change during the life of the agent, and at the same time the basis of the agent decisions is not considered. In the model 'leader-follower' only leaders have , and followers simply repeat leader's decisions with a 1 day delay. An agent does not know her own in the basic model or the leader's in the model 'leader-follower'.
There are two different approaches to modeling the stock exchange. In the first approach agents are price-takers, and in the second some agents are price-makers who have enough market power to impact to the price of an asset by their trading decisions. In the first case the price must be given exogenously, as it does not depend on the actions of price-takers, and in the second case the price is determined by aggregate supply and demand, and is therefore endogenously formed on the basis of orders submitted by the agents. In this paper we choose the first approach, as we explore small and medium-sized agents and assume that these agents do not have an impact on the asset price. We use a data of 6 stock indices to model the price of the asset, the time interval is 10 years.
We also assume that the market is sufficiently liquid and all the orders can be executed completely. All agents are speculators, so they are interested in the asset not as a long-term investment, but want to profit from price differences. Therefore, all orders are designed for the short-term and agents trade on the daily price fluctuations. In addition, the agents in our model submit only market orders. Such orders include the volume and do not specify a price, so it is immediately executed at the current market price. The agents in our model do not submit more complex orders.
We will also explore the impact of short selling and margin buying on wealth and the possibility of bankruptcy. Short selling denotes the selling of borrowed securities with a subsequent repurchase of the same securities. The trader opens a short position expecting a fall 6 in the asset price, which allows him to buy it later for less and return to the lender. Margin buying refers to the buying of securities with cash borrowed from a broker. The leverage rate denotes the ratio between the collateral and the loan. For example, a leverage rate of 1:5 means that the trader can borrow 5 times the collateral. Margin buying and short selling can increase trader's returns but it can also magnify losses. Margin trading will be prohibited on crisis days in our experiment. The prohibition can be caused by lenders as they see an increased risk of trader bankruptcy.
To assess the success of agents at the end of a day we evaluate their wealth as the sum of their cash and the number of their shares multiplied by the market price of the next day. The next day market price is used because agents will only be able to sell stocks the next day. If the wealth of the agent is less than a critical level (we use half of the initial wealth), then the agent will leave the market and we denote her as bankrupt. The usual definition of bankrupt as a person whose debt is greater than her assets cannot be applied in the models without leverage as in this case agent cannot become a debtor and can only lose all her money. This threshold was chosen as an estimation of an agent's success over 10 years of trading. The longer the interval of trading the lower such a threshold can be. This threshold is considered a stop-loss order which is designed to limit an investor's loss on a position.
As criteria for optimal strategy selection in the model when an agent does not know her leader's value of we have chosen three simple criteria: the expected wealth, the probability of positive gain from trading and the probability of bankruptcy. The last criterion is related to a version of the Safety-First criterion [Roy 1952 ], when the agent should minimize the probability of the portfolio's return falling below a minimum desired threshold (here the minimum acceptable return is 0.5). Therefore for all models we consider three parameters: 1) the average wealth of agents on the final date, 2) the fraction of agents from the whole population whose wealth on the final date was higher than the initial wealth, 3) the fraction of bankruptcies in the whole population.
Description of data
As the agents have no impact on the price of the asset, the price of the asset must be specified exogenously and we have used here daily data of the different indices for the period 01.01. 2000-31.12.2009 . The time series consists of the closing prices. We used the S&P500 ( 
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To separate days potentially suitable for restrictive measures on short selling and margin buying, we have used the volatility index, calculated with a sliding interval of 20 days, and apply the same threshold rule as in [Aleskerov and Egorova 2012] : if the volatility value does not exceed the corresponding index value multiplied by a predetermined threshold value, then we will consider that day to be regular, and in the case of excess we assume that the market is in a crisis and impose a prohibition on the opening of short positions and the use of margin buying. 
Experiment description
Basic model
At the beginning of simulations all agents have of capital and of securities, and their initial wealth is .
Agents are speculators and make decisions on the short-run. Agents differ only by the single characteristic which models the ability of the agent to correctly identify the direction of the asset price . The value is random, and is distributed according to a uniform law on the interval , it is selected at the beginning of the experiment and stays unchanged during the life of the agent on the market.
On each -th iteration agent i make a decision to buy ( ) or sell ( If short selling is forbidden, and the agent has some securities, then she will sell some of them and ~ . If short selling is allowed, then the agent sells more securities than she has. Securities can be borrowed and the trader has to buy the same volume the next day and return them to the lender. There are no other restrictions on the number of borrowed securities except the agent's wealth.
After the execution of all orders we recalculate the number of agent's securities and the agent's money , and estimate agents total wealth as If agent 's wealth at time is less than a threshold and she is declared bankrupt and leaves the market.
The goal of the experiment in the basic model is to determine the effect of on the welfare of agents and the possibility of bankruptcy, and to determine the impact of short selling and margin buying.
The model with followers
In this model we divide the agents into two equal groups. The first group act according to the scheme from the section 2.3.1 and have a single characteristic . Agents from the second group do not have a characteristic , but observe the actions of agents from the first group and simply repeat their actions with a delay of one day, that is, an agent-follower , observing the previous decision of her leader , will repeat it the next day .
For each leader there is only one follower, who does not know the value of her leader's .
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The goal is to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of an imitation strategy and to determine which leader (that is, the leader with which value of ) it is more profitable or safe, from the viewpoint of the possibility of bankruptcy, to imitate.
The model with Black Swans
In this model the agents are divided into two groups of "ordinary traders" and "black swan seekers". The agents from the first group predict the movement of the asset price well in the period of economic stability, but not in a crisis, and agents of the second group, following
Taleb's strategy, predict price movements well in a crisis, but not during stable periods.
The division of trading days into stable, -days, and crisis, -days, is to forbid short positions and margin buying in crisis days, and is used to describe agent characteristics. The method for division was described in Section 2.2.
The difference in the characteristics is as follows. "Ordinary traders" on -days make the right decision with probability , which is assigned to the agent with a uniform distribution on the interval , with . On -days this probability falls and . "Black swan seekers" on the contrary make the right decisions in the regular days with smaller probability than in a crisis: , and . Thus "ordinary traders" should have better results in a stable economic situation and worse in a crisis, and "black swan seekers" are more profitable during a crisis and make losses otherwise.
The goal is to determine which strategy is most effective and whether any strategy has advantages in creating wealth or in lessening the probability of bankruptcy.
The results
The results for the basic model
For all models we consider three parameters: 1) the average wealth of remaining agents on final date, 2) the fraction of agents from the whole population whose wealth on the final date was higher than the initial wealth, 3) the fraction of bankruptcies in the whole population. Below we describe in details the results for the S&P500 index and give summary results for all indices at the end of this subsection. The complete results for all experiments are given in the Appendices. The average welfare of not-bankrupts on the final date is slightly lower than the initial wealth and equals to 9 934, and the highest possible level of wealth in this experiment is 47 610 (about 5 times higher than the initial level). The share of agents with the final wealth higher than the initial level is equal to 46.7% (Fig.3 , left panel).
During the experiment 332 of 1000 traders were declared bankrupt. The results show that agents with a lower value of have lower wealth on the final date and a higher probability of bankruptcy ( Fig. 3 , right panel). Further we investigate how the three main parameters (the average wealth of surviving agents, the fraction of agents whose the final wealth increased, and the fraction of bankruptcies in the whole population) depend on the value of p. We used a p not selected from a uniform distribution , but equal for all agents and repeated this 150 times. We then varied from 0.3 to 0.7 with increments of 0.01, making a total of experiments for each level of leverage. You can see that for agents with the probability of bankruptcy is less than 1%, and without margin trading the agents with never experienced a bankruptcy (remembering that a bankruptcy is here defined as a decline of agent's wealth below the threshold of 5000, that is, half of the initial wealth). In Fig. 4 and Table 1 , when increases the wealth of the surviving agents grows, the fraction of bankrupts also grows and the fraction of agents with the final wealth greater than the initial reduces. Now we summarize the results for all 6 stock indices. The main conclusion is based on Table 3 , and detailed results can be found in Appendix 1. Even without margin trading an agent needs to have a value of higher than 0.5 to guarantee with high probability that the final wealth is greater than the initial, and to assure very little probability of bankruptcy. Margin trading requires higher values of for the same results. For margin trading with a leverage rate of 1:10 the agent should have an extremely high , which could be possible for insiders, for instance. In Table 4 we present the results for the agent, who tosses a coin, i.e. her is equal to 0.5.
Without margin trading such agents on average cannot make a profit on the stock exchange, but using leverage causes dramatic increase of bankruptcy probability. Not many people would pay $10 000 for a lottery ticket with a 1% probability of winning $130 000 and a 99% probability of losing everything. The main results: 1. If an agent is random in her decisions ( ) and does not use margin trading, then after 10 years of trading her average wealth will be around 9500, she will have positive return from trading with probability 0.35 and she has a 6% probability of bankruptcy. 2. If an agent does not use margin trading, it is sufficient to have to 'survive' in the market for 10 years with a probability more than 0.99. The probability to gain from trading overall in this case is 0.93. And if , the agent is very unlikely to become bankrupt and will get positive return with a probability of 0.7. Such small values of seem very attractive for small traders as they only need to marginally outperform the random trader. This could be a reason why the stock market is so appealing.
Tab. 4. Parameters for agent with
3. The decision to use margin buying and short selling changes the situation dramatically.
The random agent ( = 0.5) will survive 10 years of trading with a probability of 0.48 when leverage is 1:2, with a probability of 0.11 when leverage is 1:5 and with a probability of only 0.01 when leverage is 1:10. Although the 10-year return will be 50%, 300% and 2000% respectively, in these cases, the random strategy shows the excessive risk.
4. If an agent uses margin trading, she needs to be more sophisticated and to have to survive with probability 0.99 and to survive with 0.001 probability. For ordinary traders such rate of success is almost impossible.
The results for the model with followers
In this section we discuss the results for the 'follower' strategy first for S&P 500 and for all indices at the end of the subsection. In Table 5 , leverage=0 leads to fairly good results, the probability of bankruptcy is relatively small (lower than 0.09 for S&P500 and 0.15 for other indices) and wealth increases with a non-zero probability. Compared to the basic model, where strictly determines all three parameters and it is preferable to have high , the follower can earn without respect to her leader's , although the average return is close to 0. The advantage of follower strategy is the relatively small probability of bankruptcy without respect to the value of leader's If an agent uses margin trading, the average wealth and probability of bankruptcy grow. So, the 'follower' strategy can be considered mostly more profitable in comparison with the strategy of 'tossing a coin' (Table 4) , when an agent does not use short selling and margin trading.
The high standard deviation of the average final wealth when leverage=10 is caused by the large number of agents being declared bankrupt. The evident slope of all parameters, giving a small advantage for lower values of leader's , can be explained as a particular property of chosen simplest strategy of imitation. Since our followers simply repeat the decision of her leader with a one step delay, the key factor of her success is the frequency of trend changes. If the right decision for Day 1 (see Fig.6 ) was 'to buy' and for Day 2 is 'to sell' and the leader was qualified enough to make these proper decisions (i.e. leader has high ), then the follower will make mistake on Day 2 choosing 'to buy' after her leader, because price trend changes on Day 2 from bullish to bearish. And follower's decision to sell on Day 3 will be correct as price trend continues to decline. Conversely, if the leader more often make wrong decisions (her is low), then she will be likely to choose 'to sell' on Day 1 and 'to buy' on Day 2, hence, the follower will gain on Day 2 and lose money on Day 3. And the same reasons can be given for the days when trend was switched from bearish to bullish (see The S&P500 data has 2514 observation days and 54,5% are trend-switching, so it is slightly more profitable to follow weak leaders, the CAC 40 52,7%, the DAX 51,5%, the FTSE 52,5%, the Nikkei 225, 51,5% and the Hang Seng 51,35%. For all 6 stock indices the results are very similar. Without margin trading, the probability of the bankruptcy is low and the final wealth of the followers is close to the initial value, even for the Nikkei (always slightly lower) and DAX and Hang Seng (always slightly higher) indices.
Tab. 5. Results for 'follower' strategy for S&P500 data
And for margin trading with a leverage rate of 1:10 the probability of bankruptcy was extremely 2. Even if the leader is unsuccessful and has a low , the follower has a return close to 0 when , but the advantage of a 'follower' strategy is the relatively small probability of bankruptcy 3. If an agent uses short selling and margin buying, the probability of bankruptcy increases and the probability having a positive return decreases.
4. In general, three parameters for all leverage rates for the 'follower' strategy are very close to the parameters of random strategy. Thus, the imitation strategy in general cannot help stock exchange earnings.
5. If the trader does not know her value of (a newcomer, for example), the 'follower' strategy can be preferable from the viewpoint of safety, as the probability of bankruptcy is low.
Results for the model with black swans
In our model and . Half of the agents use Taleb Perhaps the low efficiency of the 'black swan seekers' in a period of stability cannot be counterbalanced for many of them by their gains during crisis days. Fig.7 . The left panel shows agent wealth on the final date for the sample of the 'black swan seekers', the left panel shows agent wealth on the final date for the sample of ordinary agents.
"Black swan seekers" are much more exposed to the risk of bankruptcy (Fig. 8 , the value of p is on the horizontal axis and the frequency of the values is on the vertical axis) compared with ordinary agents. In this model there were 239 bankruptcies in the group of 'black swan seekers' and only 12 bankruptcies in the group of ordinary traders. Fig.8 . The left panel shows the probability p among all bankruptcies for 'black swan seekers', the right panel shows the probability p among all bankruptcies for ordinary agents.
The distribution of parameter among the bankruptcies in both groups are consistent with the results of the basic model.
The main results:
1. The average 10-year wealth of the 'black swan seeker' strategy is comparable with the average wealth of the traditional strategy, but the probability of failing is much higher. Thus, the traditional strategy of traders is not worse than Taleb's strategy. Black swans are too rare an event to be the basis of investment decisions.
Conclusion
We have analyzed different trading strategies of small and medium-size investors on the stock exchange, and the consequences of using short selling and margin buying.
The results show that there is a critical level of agent experience such that agents with this or higher level are almost sure to survive in the market over the long run. This critical level is just slightly higher than ½ for cautious behavior (i.e. the absence of margin trading) [Aleskerov and Egorova 2012] , and such a small value could explain why so many people try to trade on the stock exchange. But if trader uses margin trading, the critical level is much higher as is the risk of excessive losses.
When the agent randomly chooses to buy or to sell assets (i.e. her probability of making the right decision is 0.5) it is disadvantageous without margin trading and dangerous with it, because the probability of bankruptcy is very high. For a small trader without trading experience or access to insider information (i.e. without a high ) it can be more reasonable to follow another trader's decision. In contradiction to the seemingly obvious suggestion that following the agent with high prediction rate would be more profitable, we found the reverse, although the difference between 'following a good predictor' and 'following a bad predictor' strategies is not significant. The follower strategy can be rational and appealing for traders as an attempt to receive more information, but the reverse is a herding effect that can lead to the large losses, chaos and speculative bubbles in the market (see, for example [Corcos et al. 2002] , [Cont and Bouchaud 2000], [Harras and Sornette 2011] ).
Another result shows the danger of a "black swan strategy". There may be so few crisis days that a trader can go bankrupt while waiting for the opportunity to catch a 'black swan', and make up for her losses, although we cannot exclude the case of success with this strategy. 
